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14. ABSTRACT The Global war on Terror has refocused U.S. military efforts from traditional defense alliances to developing security cooperation relationships. The establishment of AFRICOM presents the U.S. with an enormous opportunity to foster these relationships in Africa. Bilateral and multilateral exercises and training in the region are the most effective and efficient way for AFRICOM to accomplish its security cooperation goals. This paper examines the short history of U.S. exercises in Africa, the obstacles to future exercises and establishes recommendations for a coherent, long term exercise plan for promoting security cooperation relationships in Africa.					
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**EXERCISES AND TRAINING: THE KEY TO DEVELOPING SECURITY
COOPERATION UNDER THE NEW U.S. AFRICA COMMAND.**

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

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The Global War on Terror can best be described as a global campaign against a network whose goals aim to rob the world of stability and security. Traditional defense

relationships and alliances alone are insufficient in providing security against the asymmetrical threats posed by global terrorist networks. “To succeed in our efforts, we need the support and concerted action of friends and allies.”¹ Security cooperation relationships are the focus of U.S. military efforts in this new era. These relationships emphasize multi-national military collaboration against terrorist networks best achieved in the form of exercises and training with partner nations. This paper examines how the use of exercises and training in the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) will fight terrorism and its supporting illegal activities, promote regional stability and develop security by encouraging responsible development of professional militaries on the continent.

The establishment of AFRICOM comes at a time when strategic importance of the continent is on the ascent. Operational factors in this region present a fragile framework in which to build security cooperation relationships. Time is against our efforts as terrorist networks have already established havens in Africa and trans-national criminal activity is rampant, as evidenced by piracy, illegal trade and human trafficking. The huge area of the continent presents a daunting challenge in engaging a vast network of 50 countries with enormous territory. Lastly, U.S. forces are spread thin across several regions actively engaging terrorist networks and forces available for security cooperation development will be at a premium as AFRICOM looks for support.

Despite the seemingly overwhelming factors against progress, AFRICOM’s beginning heralds a great opportunity for security cooperation relationships between the U.S and African nations. Unlike the other mature regional commands, AFRICOM’s

¹ U.S. President, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006): 8.

security relationships will develop from the interaction that has been established by its forbears in U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). These regional combatant commands have relationships with African nations that offer a firm foundation for security cooperation but lack the unity of command, unity of effort, and breadth of commitment established in other regions.

U.S. national security strategy provides the guidance for the operational objectives necessary to develop security cooperation. The AFRICOM Commander will ultimately develop the tools and methods for engagement. Multi-national exercises and training are the preeminent apparatus in the commander's toolkit for developing security cooperation relationships in the AFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR).

AFRICOM has the challenge of developing security cooperation relationships with nations that represent the entire spectrum of development from modern and industrialized to developing and failing states. Many of these nations have relatively small military forces with limited training and capacity to accomplish the security requirements that we expect of our own military forces. Furthermore, obstacles to security cooperation abound in Africa from government corruption and local crime to terrorist networks and insurgencies. Additionally, security cooperation relationships must develop in a part of the world where the U.S. has relatively little experience operating and with countries that do not share our operational paradigms in terms of operations, planning, communication or training. Fortunately, the lessons learned from the other regional commands will provide a foundation from which to develop an effective training and exercise plan that addresses these obstacles. By planning and developing a robust

training and exercise program, the AFRICOM staff can build trust with the militaries of partner nations, establish access and promote the sharing of operational and tactical ideas that lead to shared operational paradigms thereby encouraging professional military development in the region.

Before AFRICOM develops its own regional objectives toward achieving theater security cooperation, it is essential to understand their source of guidance: U.S. strategic goals. Regional combatant command staffs draw their guidance for the development of security cooperation objectives from the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) promulgated by their Combatant Commander. In the case of AFRICOM, a TSCP has not yet been fully developed or officially promulgated. Thus, to understand how an AFRICOM TSCP will develop, it is useful to examine the source guidance for TSCPs: the Department of Defense (DoD) Security Cooperation Guidance and the TSCPs of other combatant commands.

The DoD Security Cooperation Guidance “describes the Secretary of Defense’s priorities for creating new partnerships and building the capacity of existing partnerships (U).”² The Security Cooperation Guidance makes assumptions drawn from the National Defense Strategy. These assumptions form the outline of U.S. strengths, vulnerabilities, opportunities and challenges. It also provides the national-strategic guidance for the development of TSCPs. The goals outlined in the Strategic Guidance section are to assure allies and partners, dissuade potential adversaries, deter aggression and counter coercion, or defeat adversaries (U).³ The first goal, to assure allies and partners, is most relevant to the AFRICOM staff operational objectives and, if successfully advanced, minimizes the

² U.S. Department of Defense. *Security Cooperation Guidance* (U). 22 November 2005. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. <http://www.hq.pacom.smil.mil> (accessed 30 April 2007): 1.

³ Ibid. (Secret). Information extracted is unclassified. 2.

need for operating under the other three goals. Key tools that the Security Cooperation Guidance outlines for achieving its objectives are combined/multinational exercises and combined/multinational training.⁴

The three regional commands that formerly oversaw the security cooperation efforts in Africa will also contribute to the formation of a unified regional operational framework. All of their TSCP goals are derived from the Security Cooperation Guidance and address theater-specific issues.⁵ The TSCP is the commander's overall guidance for regional security issues and drives the development of exercise and training plans. The commander's assumptions, execution guidance and desired end state are key components of the TSCP's usefulness as a planning tool. The opening statement of the EUCOM TSCP best explains the goal of theater security cooperation relationships and the desired impact that EUCOM wishes to achieve through them:

(U) Security cooperation is the cornerstone of U.S. European Command's (EUCOM's) proactive effort to engage our allies and partners in building capacity to counter terrorism, protect homelands and common interests, and help prevent other threats from emerging. EUCOM's security cooperation program has contributed to building key relationships which promote U.S. strategic interests, enhance allied and friendly capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, provide for essential peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure, and improve information exchange and intelligence sharing to harmonize views on security challenges in this dangerous global arena.⁶

Through "proactively" engaging our partners, the U.S. develops relationships. These relationships work to build conditions for stability and security in the region. The

⁴ Ibid. (Secret). Information extracted is unclassified. 4.

⁵ Multiple Sources. USEUCOM, USPACOM, and USCENTCOM TSCPs. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.

⁶ U.S. European Command. *Theater Security Cooperation Strategy* (U) August 2006. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified. <http://www.tepmis.eucom.smil.mil> (accessed 1 May 2007): ii.

exercise and training plan is then vital to developing those relationships and creating a unity of effort between the U.S. and its partners to achieve shared security goals.

In developing an effective exercise plan, the framework must consider the factors of available U.S. forces, the complexity of dealing in such a large region, and the limited time it has to develop security cooperation relationships. Due to the involvement of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, few will be available for AFRICOM exercises and will thereby influence the scope of any prospective exercises. As more forces, tasks, and nations are involved, exercise planning and execution complexity increases. Exercises must also promote the growth of security cooperation relationships by developing a common operational paradigm to achieve unity of effort among partner nations.

Understanding the commonality of methods, tasks and abilities of U.S. and partner nation staffs are the critical elements of a common operational paradigm and will lead to greater understanding and less complex working relationships.

Given that the war against terror is a global campaign, theater security cooperation can best be implemented by a major operation in each region. The AFRICOM AOR has a clean slate with which to establish an operational plan to develop security cooperation relationships. Since training and exercises are the critical tools in these operations, a long-term plan for engaging partner nations is necessary.

The first, and least complex, exercise plan incorporates a small contingent of either joint or single service component forces, operating under a bilateral arrangement. Exercise and training objectives in this environment are limited and easy to plan with the host nation. The footprint of U.S. forces in the host nation is small and places very little strain on the local infrastructure to support the exercise. The drawback is that limited

security cooperation training beyond the tactical level is achieved because planning and execution happen at the tactical-operational level. Borrowing from the EUCOM precedent in Africa, one example of this type of exercise is the U.S.-Tunisian Exercise ATLAS DROP. In this exercise, platoon-size units practice airborne drops and live-fire drills. Another example of this type of exercise is the U.S. – Philippines Exercise MARSURVEX. Larger and slightly more complex than ATLAS DROP, MARSURVEX is conducted quarterly and is “designed to improve Over the Horizon Targeting (OTHT) and maritime operations...”⁷ This exercise allows small numbers of U.S. and Philippines ships and maritime patrol aircraft to work together and has a long history of constructive maritime cooperation. The long history of MARSURVEX has developed a common operational paradigm between U.S. and Philippines forces that has led to the ability to conduct this exercise so frequently. In both examples, the small number of forces involved eases the planning complexity, minimizes footprint in country, and conducts valuable tactical training, but makes limited progress toward establishing the legitimacy of American commitment in Africa. In some cases, where that commitment is not in question, tactical-level exercises may be appropriate.

Another option for exercise planning requires larger U.S. forces participating in a comparable of bi-lateral exercises conducted in series with multiple nations. The commitment of U.S. forces to this plan is often for weeks, sometimes months, and requires forces that are very flexible, easily transportable and self-sustaining. The planning for these events is very complex because they require coordination with multiple partner nations generally on a bi-lateral basis. In some circumstances, planning

⁷ Operations Division, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group Republic of Philippines Commander Pacific Command Representative. Exercises. <http://manila.usembassy.gov>. (accessed 25 April 2007).

can also be facilitated by multi-lateral planning conferences where the common format for all nations involved eases the complexity of the planning process. Once established, the framework for this type of exercise can be used regularly, often annually. This type of exercise also involves a slightly greater strain on the host nation infrastructure required to support the larger forces involved. The benefits are greater than the single bilateral exercise because U.S. forces are able to plan and operate with multiple nations in a common exercise format. The West African Training Cruise and Combined Afloat Readiness And Training (CARAT) exercises are prime examples of this type of exercise. The West African Training Cruise, last conducted in 2005 between the U.S., Gabon and Cameroon, is a relatively small exercise whose participants vary from year to year. It uses amphibious ships, Seabee construction units and medical visits to "...maintain and extend combined operational capability with allied and friendly nations' armed forces."⁸ In addition to the military security aspects of the amphibious forces training, this exercise conducts engineering and medical training and care of local people as a humanitarian contribution to greater regional stability. Civil and humanitarian assistance must not be underestimated as an element of building security cooperation and should be a core objective of all exercise planning in Africa. The assistance provided not only directly benefits the local populace and promote stability, but also creates a much needed framework for U.S. forces to exercise stability and reconstruction operations in an unfamiliar environment.

The CARAT exercise program is a Task Force 73 sponsored multi-lateral naval exercise conducted annually in Southeast Asia. The purpose of CARAT, as described by its executive agent last year, Rear Adm. William Burke, Commander Task Force 73, is

⁸ U.S. European Command. "2005 Exercises." <http://www.eucom.mil> (accessed 6 April 2007).

“to build understanding that can prove useful in a variety of scenarios, from maritime interdiction to rescue at sea.”⁹ CARAT is a six phase exercise where Task Force 73 units work with the navies of Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines. Last year, the U.S. committed three ships, including a USCG cutter, elements of the 4th Marine Regiment and two maritime patrol aircraft. In addition to maritime operations, humanitarian projects such as “community service projects, as well as, medical, dental, veterinary and engineering civic action projects” were also conducted.¹⁰ By engaging many partner nations with very few forces, the CARAT exercise program is a valuable example of the security cooperation potential that other regional multi-phase, bilateral exercises can strive to accomplish.

The most complex, and rare, exercise and training that can be conducted is both joint and multi-lateral. These capstone exercises are incredibly complex, costly, and involve months to years of planning. The impact on the local infrastructure is enormous and requires a friendly population that is willing to accommodate such a large military presence. Common operational paradigms are firmly established between the forces involved in this scenario and are rigorously exercised. The goals of this type of exercise go far beyond tactical security cooperation and involve broader theater-strategic goals between the participating nations. An exercise this complex is reserved for the most structured allied arrangements. The cooperation prerequisites to conduct an exercise of this magnitude do not currently exist in Africa. However, it is the preeminent example of the potential that exercises have for building security cooperation and maintaining unity of effort between allies. Examples of this type of exercise include the PACOM-

⁹ MC1 Brian Brannon. “U.S., Indonesian Navies Partner for CARAT”. Navy Newsstand. 11 August 2006. <http://www.navy.mil> (accessed 29 April 2007).

¹⁰ Ibid.

sponsored Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. RIMPAC is a biennial exercise with a 36 year history. In 2006, RIMPAC involved 35 ships, 160 aircraft and 19,000 personnel from Australia, Japan, Chile, Canada, Peru, Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States.¹¹ Hopefully, through future engagement of African nations, the U.S. can develop the security cooperation relationships necessary to conduct an exercise of this size with African partners in the future.

Aside from the potential exercise frameworks that are available as examples, EUCOM has contributed the most toward establishing a precedent for AFRICOM in the development of a training and exercise plan for Africa. PACOM and CENTCOM, having much smaller sections of Africa in their AORs' compared to EUCOM, have made correspondingly smaller contributions to exercises and training in Africa. Assuring partners and developing security cooperation relationships has always been the focus of EUCOM's effort in Africa. However, because of the difficulties of working in such a large AOR and with the formal commitments the U.S has with NATO and other European countries, the EUCOM exercise plan in Africa has been inconsistent and haphazard. Efforts have been made recently to develop a more organized and robust exercise and training plan that addresses regional security concerns.

The EUCOM exercise schedule in Africa is immature compared to the plans in other regions and varies in length and complexity from year to year. Many African nations have participated with EUCOM toward developing security cooperation relationships with the U.S military. Exercises such as Shared Accord, Flintlock and MEDFLAG have established promising precedents for future cooperation. Shared Accord

¹¹ RIMPAC 2006 Coalition Information Bureau. "Successful Multinational RIMPAC 2006 Exercise Concludes". 29 August 2006. <http://www.navy.mil> (accessed 29 April 2006).

is an annual exercise based on EUCOM's Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative that aims to provide training for U.S. forces operating in the Sub-Saharan African environment and improve the humanitarian and peacekeeping capabilities of partner African nations. Last year, it was conducted only with Niger, though initially conceived as a multi-national peacekeeping exercise. Conversely, the Flintlock Exercise is a truly multilateral exercise that incorporates European and NATO partners to "enhance African nations' ability to patrol and control their own territory."¹² In 2005, through Flintlock, the U.S. trained with forces from Algeria, Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. Finally, MEDFLAG involves EUCOM medical teams conducting training with African partners on mass casualty drills. The last MEDFLAG exercise, conducted in 2005, was conducted with Angola and Morocco. These three programs all contribute to greater security cooperation, primarily at the tactical level, but have a short and inconsistent history as they are not conducted regularly as initially conceived.

Recent efforts by EUCOM have been designed to remedy the incoherent program of the past to one that addresses regional security issues of nations in the strategically important, and resource rich, region of the Gulf of Guinea. The Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea Conference was held in November 2006. The conference, requested by regional partner nations, was sponsored by EUCOM, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the State Department. The goal of the conference was "adopting a practical, comprehensive and sustainable strategy to address maritime safety and security challenges."¹³ As this strategy develops, it will inevitably be

¹² Jim Garamone. "Flintlock Exercise Trains Africans to Handle Defense". American Forces Press Service News Articles. 17 June 2005. <http://www.defenselink.mil> (accessed 30 April 2007).

¹³ American Forces Press Service. "Gulf of Guinea Maritime Safety, Security Conference Begins." 14 November 2006. <http://www.navy.mil> (accessed 6 April 2007).

an important factor in the security cooperation efforts of AFRICOM and will provide useful guidance for an effective exercise and training program.

In addition to the current state of EUCOM involvement in Africa, it is imperative that training and exercise objectives recognize the abundant obstacles that will affect their success. Some African nations are timid to currently engage the U.S. in military aspects of security cooperation. Africa is rife with internal conflict and global terrorist networks are working to establish sanctuaries. Crime and corruption are rampant in many African governments and societies. Limited partner nation capabilities also influence exercise and training opportunities. Lastly, and most importantly, it is unlikely that AFRICOM will have sufficient forces assigned to accommodate an exercise and training plan as robust as that seen in EUCOM or PACOM. Each of these obstacles presents the developing AFRICOM staff with enormous challenges in developing an effective plan for developing security coordination partnerships.

Nations that are shy to participate in military exercises and training are few but some may not initially find in their interests to develop military relationships with the U.S. AFRICOM can influence these nations by broadening its interaction with other militaries in the region and, with the agreement of host nations, invite observers to survey the conduct of exercises. Many U.S. training efforts in Africa have been focused on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping training. As these operation relationships grow, unity of effort will likely develop between nations and encourage other nations into cooperative engagement.

Third party organizations will also be helpful in promoting security cooperation relationships with other African nations. The African Union (AU) and the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are regional institutions with member nations committed to security cooperation and peacekeeping. These organizations will be useful in encouraging broader security cooperation involvement in Africa. Furthermore, U.S. efforts will gain legitimacy in the region if they are sponsored by regional organizations.

European nations also have special relationships with certain African countries that can be helpful. Nations with former colonies in Africa, such as Great Britain and France, will be useful partners in fostering security cooperation between the U.S. and African countries. An example of how these relationships has already been helpful is the case of a recent maritime security exercise conducted by the USS Kauffman (FFG 59) in the Gulf of Guinea. Last March, the Kauffman and ships from France and Cameroon participated in a day-long maneuvering exercise off the coast of Cameroon. Observers were present from Cameroon, Gabon, France, and Sao Tome and Principe and conducted additional communication and cooperative training.¹⁴

Where internal and external pressures have created conflict within nations such as Nigeria, Liberia and Ivory Coast, the extent of our exercise and training opportunities will be limited by direction from higher executive authority. When the direction comes to develop security relationships despite internal conflict it is imperative to consider what operational objectives wish to be achieved. Training government military forces will undoubtedly place our forces at risk from anti-government forces thus added force protection measures will be needed. This risk can also be mitigated by conducting the exercise in another, more stable, nearby nation.

¹⁴ CNE-C6F Public Affairs. "Gulf of Guinea Multilateral Exercise Improves Maritime Security." 27 March 2007 <http://www.c6f.navy.mil> (accessed 6 April 2007).

Global terrorist organizations will also have a major role in the security of any training and exercise plan. Al Qaeda has developed terrorist cells in countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania. Although it is very unlikely that AFRICOM will be tasked to develop security cooperation relationships with Somalia, training and exercises with friendly partners where U.S. interests have come under attack, as the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania stand out in recent history, will require added vigilance and force protection planning. Fortunately, no U.S. exercises have yet come under attack in Africa but our vulnerability exists nonetheless as exhibited by the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in neighboring Yemen.

In several African nations where security cooperation relationships are most important to U.S. interests, crime and corruption are commonplace. Nigeria stands out as a prime example. Nigeria supplies ten percent of America's imported oil and is the world's eighth largest oil exporter yet struggles with among the lowest gross domestic product of any country in Africa.¹⁵ This disparity is the result of rampant corruption throughout all levels of government. Planning a humanitarian or peacekeeping exercise in countries where corruption is prevalent may hamper military interaction. However, despite corruption obstacles, where the host nation is willing to welcome AFRICOM security cooperation relationships, any interaction will be better than none. Valuable training can be conducted and post-exercise assessments will be helpful in determining which elements of the host nations' military were most professional.

African force capability will be an additional obstacle to the development of effective security cooperation relationships. Similar to the limited resources likely to be

¹⁵ Patrick Paterson, "Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 45 (2d Quarter 2007): 29.

allocated to AFRICOM, most African nations have small military forces compared to our own. However, as has been shown by all other regional combatant commands, useful exercises can be conducted with small forces in even the most austere environments. The footprint of U.S. forces will have to be weighed against the ability of the host nation to adequately support those forces. In these cases, single ships, like the case of the USS Kauffman, small ground forces and utility aircraft, present a small and temporary footprint to conduct useful training.

As AFRICOM develops, policy makers will decide what forces to assign to the region. Currently, forces assigned to Commander, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based in Djibouti, will eventually fall into AFRICOM's area of responsibility. These forces are actively engaged in operations against terrorist networks in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Africa and are unlikely candidates for exercises beyond the JTF-HOA area of responsibility. Forces assigned to EUCOM have been used in the past to conduct training and exercises as explained earlier. However, these forces will not fall under AFRICOM operational control after Africa is removed from EUCOM's area of responsibility. Furthermore, with the exception of CJTF-HOA in Djibouti, there are no U.S. bases in Africa from which to operate. Even AFRICOM headquarters will initially be located alongside EUCOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Without a headquarters on the continent, the opportunity to base U.S. forces in or near areas of greatest interest is remote. Flexible, and easily sustainable, forces will initially be the only option for force employment in AFRICOM exercises. Small ground, naval or aviation forces can be hosted by partner nations for short periods, in even austere conditions, provided basic support services are available.

. Fragmented efforts of past operations combined with the obstacles inherent to working in Africa will make the future of AFRICOM security cooperation development daunting. The first step to moving forward will be the establishment of a headquarters for AFRICOM located in Africa. The staff will gain knowledge and understanding of the environment in which they work but, more importantly, it will show an unprecedented U.S. commitment to regional stability and security cooperation. Steps are already underway to implement this objective.

Once the AFRICOM base has been established on the continent, the greatest obstacle the combatant commander will have in effectively engaging partner nations will be finding U.S. forces available to conduct security cooperation exercises. The recent history of U.S. commitment of forces to the region has been very limited. Therefore, efficiency of force is paramount. As the case of the USS Kauffman has shown, small forces are capable of bolstering African confidence in America's commitment to the region.

The bilateral exercise series and multilateral exercise program described earlier will be the most efficient methods for employing U.S. forces in Africa. Token ships, aircraft, and small ground forces working with as many countries as possible, in series or concurrently, will maximize training opportunities and cooperation potential with minimal commitment of forces. These exercises will require a great deal of planning. Beginning with addressing the security concerns of partner African nations will make the planning process easier because it will create a condition of trust where our partners understand that our goal is cooperative security on common terms. Unity of effort in theater security cooperation will begin to grow when AFRICOM has established the trust

necessary to conduct training and exercises, on a consistent and predictable basis, and nations become accustomed to working with U.S. forces.

The success that other regional combatant commands have had in developing regional security cooperation was built on a long history of active engagement of partner nations. AFRICOM, building on the precedent of engagement by three other regional combatant commands, will have the benefits of a wealth of experience gleaned from the other combatant commands and the operational focus of a single U.S. commander in Africa. Additionally, the announced inclusion of a State Department official to serve as the Deputy Commander for AFRICOM, will contribute to streamlining the diplomatic, humanitarian and civic action efforts in the region.

Ultimately, the AFRICOM staff will have to build on the existing relationships with African nations to construct conditions of stability and security that satisfy U.S. and partner strategic interests. Working with partner nations to develop unity of effort in theater security cooperation will build relationships with African nations. The security cooperation relationships we build in Africa will be the network we use fight terrorist organizations, ensure access to the region and encourage stability in Africa. A coherent and consistent exercise and training program, that proactively engages African security concerns and overcomes inherent obstacles, will be the tool that creates and maintains these relationships.

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